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Public Services in the UK: the
Ongoing Challenges of Delivery and
Public Accountability
Introduction
Emma Bell, Clémence Fourton and Nicholas Sowels
1 This special edition of the French Journal of British Studies was prompted by the eruption
of  a  number  of  scandals  concerning  private  companies  involved  in  the  running  of
public services in the UK, notably the liquidation of Carillion in January 2018. Carillion
was a multinational construction and facilities management services company based in
Wolverhampton, employing 19,000 people in the UK alone. It was heavily involved in
the provision of public services in Britain, such as building infrastructure and hospitals,
maintaining  prisons,  providing  school  meals  and  defence  accommodation  –  it  is
estimated  that  its  work  for  the  UK government  accounted  for  38 % of  its  declared
revenue in 2016.1 When the company was liquidated, there were significant costs, not
just to the thousands of people who lost their jobs, but also to the British taxpayer, as
the government was forced to pay out just under £150 million in order to keep essential
services running.2 Ultimately, it is the State that remains, and is expected to remain,
responsible  for  public  service  delivery  and to  guarantee  the  smooth functioning of
regulatory mechanisms so that there is accountability between service providers and
users. In the case of Carillion, a House of Commons Report found that the company’s
governance suffered from “a chronic lack of accountability and professionalism”.3 Yet
the existing legislative and regulatory framework was inadequate to respond to,  or
even to pick up on, these problems. How was it possible for such a large company and
government  contractor  to  go  into  compulsory  liquidation,  despite  concerns  having
been  raised  about  its  finances  as  early  as  2015?  Why  were  the  firm’s  financial
weaknesses not exposed and acted upon, notably by the regulators? Why did public
organisations and officials continue to pass the company contracts?
2 The papers in this collection do not specifically analyse the case of Carillion. But they
do focus on private sector involvement in the provision of public services in a range of
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different areas,  from  probation  to  education  and  social  housing  through  to
infrastructure building, energy and regulation. As a result, they provide some insight
into the way systems of regulation and accountability function in the UK, thus giving
some answers as to why these often prove inadequate. Indeed, the Carillion incident
was not isolated but is rather representative of wider systemic problems: in the words
of the House of Commons report on the subject, “Carillion could happen again, and
soon”.4 Carillion was but one further instalment in a litany of failures and scandals
affecting private providers of public services in recent years, leading to considerable
losses to the public purse and/or seriously affecting service delivery, as well as failing
on accountability standards. The UK government’s bail-out and then renationalisation
of the Stagecoach/Virgin East Coast rail franchise for passenger transport has also been
highly  controversial,  while  the  flagship  project  of  creating  a  high-speed  rail  link
between London and the north of England (HS2) risks huge delays and cost over-runs.5
Atos, Capita and G4S have also come under public scrutiny for failing to fulfil  their
contracts adequately, accused of incompetence, fraud and serious social harm, notably
in the field of welfare provision.6 Yet they continue to be regarded by British officials as
viable  outsourcing  options.  In  particular,  British  governments  keep  resorting  to  a
spatial division of markets such as asylum seeker housing, welfare-to-work schemes, or
rail, in which a small number of large companies reap the benefits of State-sanctioned
market opening.
 
The Challenges of Delivery
3 Alongside increasing private-sector involvement in public services, there has been a
simultaneous  rise  of  performance  monitoring,  driven  by  the  move  to  New  Public
Management  (NPM),  whereby  managerial  practices  from  the  private  sector  were
transferred to the public sector. From the 1980s onwards, and especially in the wake of
John  Major’s  Citizen’s  Charter,  public  services  have  been  encouraged  to  adopt
evaluative  measures  such as  Key Performance Indicators  (KPIs),  commonly used by
private  companies,  in  order  to  demonstrate  their  efficiency  and  facilitate  public
accountability.  In  an  attempt  to  move  from  an  ethos  of  bureaucratic  paternalism,
whereby the State and its agents determine what is  in the best interests of service
users, successive neoliberal governments have sought to render public services more
consumer-focussed,  notably  through  evaluative  mechanisms  aimed  at  measuring
satisfaction  –  often  in  a  quantitative  way.  Service  quality  is  considered  to  be  an
essential element of performance measurement using survey-based instruments. It is
increasingly regarded as one indicator of competitive performance, yet the notion of
quality is by no means straightforward: 
The  practice  of  quality  management…  is  characterised  by  tensions  between
different definitions of quality, diverse attempts to ‘speak for’ the user/consumer
and uneasy compromises between professional attempts to define quality and the
creation of bureaucratic systems (and empires) which regulate quality.7
4 Indeed, there is no agreed definition of what might constitute a measurement of quality
in public services and it may differ significantly depending on whether we examine
quality from the perspective of users or providers of services. For example, Françoise
Granoulhac  shows here  how school  buildings  built  under  Private  Finance  Initiative
schemes are subject to heated debate regarding their “quality”. Whereas buildings can
be said to be of good architectural quality, this criterion does not necessarily match the
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lived experience of the people actually using the buildings on a daily basis, for whom
issues such as the amount of natural light available, or more generally the ergonomics
of their workplace are paramount.
5 That said, quality in public services might commonly be understood as encompassing
some or all of the following elements: accessibility, competence, integrity, reliability,
responsiveness and safety.8 These may be incompatible. For example, a number of the
contributors  to  this  special  issue  highlight  the  problems  of  safety  that  negatively
impact on the quality of service provision. David Fée, for instance, notes the failure of
private contractors providing public housing to refugees to meet KPIs regarding health
and  safety  issues.  Steve  Tombs  documents  the  catastrophic  consequences  of  local
authorities’ safety oversights in the tragic case of the Grenfell tower fire, leading to a
breakdown of social protection. Lucie de Carvalho focuses on the failure of regulatory
mechanisms vis-à-vis private energy providers to respect climate transition targets and
thus protect public health by mitigating the damaging effects of pollution. She also
emphasises an interesting clash between different public interests. Whilst it may be in
the  public  interest  to  reduce  pollution for  health  and safety  reasons  and to  tackle
climate change, doing so may threaten another aspect of service quality, namely value
for  money.  Significantly,  the  Electricity  Act  of  2010  effectively  rendered  consumer
interests  to  access  cheap energy subservient  to the need to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions and guarantee a reliable supply of electricity.
6 Pierre Wokuri examines one, interesting alternative for trying to square the circle of
these  conflicting  interests  through  the  development  of  community  energy  groups.
These emerged notably during the 2010s as alternative suppliers of electricity from
renewable resources.  They are community-led,  controlled and owned, and have the
twofold advantage not just of promoting renewable energy but also getting citizens
involved locally in the production and distribution of electricity. However, their impact
has remained limited on the whole, as they remain squeezed between the dominant
State and market mechanisms which provide the bulk of  the UK’s electricity.  More
generally,  there are obvious structural reasons why grass-roots,  “small is  beautiful”
alternative  systems  struggle  to  provide  services  which  generally  rely  on  vast
infrastructures to deliver to minimum guaranteed services to entire populations.
 
The Challenges of Accountability
Defining accountability
7 The discrepancies  that  may arise between policy objectives and outcomes raise  the
question of accountability for the delivery of public services. Here again, we run up
against a complex notion that is far from being straightforward, both conceptually and
politically. Most people assume they know what accountability means, but the term is
extremely  difficult  to  define.  What  does  it  mean  to  be  accountable?  Who  is
accountable? To whom or what? What for?  According to the International Institute for
Democracy and Electoral Assistance: 
We can say that there is democratic accountability in service delivery when citizens
or their representatives question or provide feedback on a public service, and the
political  actors  and  service  providers  either  act  on  that  feedback  or  face
consequences.9
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8 Whereas accountability is of relatively little importance in the private sphere, because
failing companies simply go bankrupt, the notion has a specific meaning in the public
domain: firstly, by definition, collective services provided are often essential both to all
citizens’ day-to-day existence and very survival and to society’s smooth functioning.
For  instance,  in  the  case  of  the  provision  of  healthcare  or  clean  water,  those
responsible for providing these services must be held to particularly high standards of
probity, given that these services are funded through public money and that any failure
to deliver entails huge social liabilities. Moreover, the functioning of public services
tends  to  be  all  the  more  difficult  to  monitor,  as  continuity  of  service  must  be
guaranteed and there are strong limits to how market forces can operate.  Business
failure leading to an end of operations is simply not an option. At a pinch, a hospital or
university could be shut. But the same is hardly possible for major rail services or water
supplies. 
9 Accountability for delivery is therefore essential to the proper functioning of public
services, and constitutes a key element of a functioning democracy: if officials fail to
fulfil  the  social  contract  though  the  universal  provision  of  quality  services  at
reasonable cost, they can expect to be ejected from public office. Public officials are
therefore  individually  responsible,  but  accountability  also  comprises  the  notion  of
systemic responsibility: given that individuals are obliged to work within a particular
legislative  or  administrative  framework,  responsibility  must  also  apply  to  the
overarching system in which they work.9 Who is accountable for public service delivery
is often difficult to establish: is it the individual public servant – the police officer or
the nurse – and/or the minister responsible for the particular government department
responsible for ensuring the proper delivery of a particular service,  or indeed local
authorities, or the government that has failed to guarantee effective mechanisms of
accountability?  Historically,  British government has  been based on the principle  of
ministerial responsibility, as Lucie de Carvalho points out: the Haldane Report from
1918  stated  that  “the  act  of  every  civil  servant  is  […]  regarded  as  the  act  of  his
minister”.  This  principle  was later  restated during Labour’s  creation of  the welfare
state  after  World  War  II,  in  the  famous  (if  probably  apocryphal)  words  of  Aneurin
Bevan: “The sound of a dropped bedpan in Tredegar Hospital will reverberate round
the Palace of Westminster”.10 But since then, such direct ministerial responsibly has
become considerably more difficult to ensure, even if still desirable, given the extent to
which the private sector has become involved in public service delivery, thus diffusing
real,  operational  responsibility  for  delivering  services  across  many  organisational
levels, and so requiring more varied accountability processes. These questions are not
theoretical,  but may have substantive legal, material and human implications: Steve
Tombs shows here, for example, how in the face of such a lethal accident as the Grenfell
Tower fire in June 2017, accountability has been viewed as crucial to social reparation
and the application of justice and yet it has been difficult to pinpoint responsibilities
for this tragedy.
10 Another complex issue entails determining who exactly providers of public services are
accountable to.  If  we assume that accountability is  fundamental to democracy, then
these  providers  are  primarily  responsible  to  the  demos and  to  their  elected
representatives. Again, the issue becomes more complex once private companies are
involved, as they are also accountable to their shareholders, which may of course lead
to conflicts  of  interest.  This is  especially the case when individuals repeatedly pass
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through the revolving door between the public and the private sectors, a phenomenon
particularly common in the energy sector.11 Indeed, one study in 2016 revealed that
nearly 90 per cent of people leaving the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy took up jobs in the energy sector, including six former Energy Ministers.12
11 Furthermore,  it  is  difficult  to  determine  exactly  how  accountability  should  be
measured. Firstly, what should public service providers be accountable for? It is widely
assumed  that  there  are  two  aspects  to  accountability  here.  There  is  the  original,
financial,  notion of accountability which entails  providers submitting themselves to
audit  and  inspection  to  ensure  that  money  is  spent  wisely.  However,  such
measurements are not in themselves straightforward, as there may be much conflict
over the interpretation of what it means to spend money wisely. Efforts to save money
may also  of  course  conflict  with the  second measure  of  accountability,  namely  the
quality of service provision. Again, there may of course be disagreement over what
constitutes good quality service provision, as highlighted above. Secondly, it is difficult
to determine which methods might best ensure accountability:  can this be done by
instilling  a  positive  culture;  by  improving  transparency;  and/or  by  audit  and
inspection? 
 
The Challenges to Upholding Accountability 
12 Perhaps the biggest obstacle to ensuring accountability in public service delivery is that
the regulatory mechanisms designed to uphold it  are  often derided as  unnecessary
‘red-tape’  encouraging excessive bureaucratic control and hindering the freedom of
enterprise. In the context of the move towards NPM, it was assumed that the State and
the services it  provided had often acted unaccountably beforehand. Indeed,  the old
Morrisonian model of state ownership and control of utilities and services provided the
general public with very little say in how those services were delivered and little means
of  redress  should  they  find  them  wanting.  Incidentally,  this  is  why  recent  plans
advanced  by  the  Labour  Party  to  renationalise  utilities  proposed  more  horizontal,
participatory  forms  of  ownership  and  management  to  facilitate  democratic
accountability.13 On  the  Right,  Margaret  Thatcher  famously  railed  against  state
bureaucracy  and  believed  that  privatising  utilities  and  introducing  managerialist
reforms  into  public  services  would  improve  accountability.  Contrary  to  traditional
public sector accountability that was thought to flow upwards between civil servants
and politicians who would make paternalistic  decisions about what was in the best
interests of service users, these reforms were meant to provide service users with more
power  by  allowing  them  to  exercise  consumer  choice  and  to  participate  in  user
evaluation surveys whereby they could give feedback to providers.14
13 In practice, however, the trend towards the increased involvement of the private sector
in  the  provision  of  public  services  has  not  provided  significantly  more  choice  for
consumers, nor always improved accountability. As Mary Corcoran points out in her
contribution examining the contracting out of probation services, over the past decade
there has actually been a trend away from competition towards oligopoly. Whilst the
Conservative-Liberal  Democrat  Coalition  government’s  decision  to  contract  out
probation  services  in  2013  was  meant  to  advance  the  ‘Big  Society’  agenda  by
encouraging  private  and  third  sector  providers  to  bid  for  contracts,  eight  private
consortia were awarded all of the twenty-one contracts to run probation services in
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England and Wales.  This  trend is  not  confined to  probation services,  but  to  public
sector contracts more generally. Research by The Financial Times found that in 2018, 23%
of all public sector contracts went to a sole bidder.15 Companies such as G4S, Serco and
Capita  dominate  the  growing  market  for  outsourcing  and  contracting  which  is
estimated to cost the UK government £251.5 billion per year.16
14 Given the market dominance of these actors, it is particularly difficult to hold them to
account. The fact that the government has repeatedly awarded them contracts despite
obvious failures of service delivery, such as when G4S was found to have charged for
electronically monitoring offenders who were in prison or dead, suggests that they, like
the banks in 2008,  are  widely  considered to  be “too big to  fail”.  Should regulatory
regimes  be  considered  too  hostile,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  they  improve
accountability,  these  multinationals  can easily  hold  the  UK government  hostage by
threatening to move elsewhere17. This may go at least some way to explaining what de
Carvalho  describes  in  this  issue  as  “the  inherently  ad  hoc  and  flexible  British
accountability culture”. 
15 A significant accountability problem has also arisen as marketisation processes and
private sector interests  have seeped into the regulation process itself.  Steve Tombs
again here  notes  how Local  Authority  Environmental  Health Officers,  charged with
upholding food safety, occupational health and pollution control, are now increasingly
trained with private sector concerns in mind and complete work placements as part of
their training with the principal UK supermarket chains such as Asda, Sainsbury’s and
Tesco’s.  Furthermore,  private  companies  are  now  increasingly  involved  in  the
regulation process, notably under the Primary Authority Scheme, initially introduced
in 2009. This allows companies operating in a number of regulatory jurisdictions to
register with just one local authority which then becomes responsible for its regulation
on a national basis. According to Tombs, this considerably weakens the capacity of local
authorities to adequately carry out their regulation duties, especially given that many
of them apply a light-touch approach out of fear of losing jobs and business for their
local area. Under what the Blair government marketed as ‘better regulation’ but which
has  actually  led  to  a  significant  decline  of  regulatory  enforcement,  regulation  is
increasingly about facilitating the actions of private capital rather than regulating it
per se. Even when local authorities do seek to impose strict regulations, in many cases,
as David Fée points out here, private companies simply opt to pay a fine for breach of
contract and carry on business as usual.
16 Holding private companies to account is  further complicated by the fact that there
have been simultaneous trends towards marketisation and centralisation, as the State
still seeks, often ineffectively, to maintain its regulatory function. As Mary Corcoran
notes in her contribution, outsourcing has had the paradoxical effect of “reproduc[ing]
and multiply[ing] [state power] through the diffusion of obligatory accountability to
greater numbers of agents who carry out public welfare or penal work in the local state
or in civil society”. Rather than reinforcing accountability, this has instead generated
such  complexity  that  regulatory  enforcement  becomes  inefficient.  Similarly,  de
Carvalho  argues  that  the  creation  of  regulatory  quangos  in  the  energy  sector  has
created  what  she  describes  as  “an  institutional  in-betweenness  for  accountability”,
meaning  that  accountability  becomes  further  removed  from  both  the  State  and
independent regulators.  
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Contextual Challenges: Complexity, Democratic
Deficits, Brexit, Covid-19 and beyond
17 The  current  state  of  public  services  and  accountability  –  as  presented  here  –  may
therefore seem to be unsatisfactory. Yet, it may well be asked if there are simple, over-
arching conclusions to be drawn about where policy should go. NPM, which is actually
now  quite  old,  has  many  failings,  and  in  its  election  manifesto  in  December  2019,
Labour  did  commit  itself  to  bringing  rail,  mail,  water  and energy  back  into  public
ownership.18 It  recognised  that  there  cannot  be  any  return  to  the  Morrisonian,
vertically-integrated model of nationalised industries implemented after World War II,
when Britain on the one hand was a far more disciplined and politically egalitarian
society than it is today as a result of the War, while goods and services in both the
public and private sectors were far less complex than they are now. In fact, Labour
plans for  re-nationalisation partly acknowledged these issues de facto,  by proposing
hybrid  structures  for  new publicly-owned services:  e.g.  energy  industries  would  be
managed  by  a  national  agency,  as  well  as  regional  and  municipal  agencies.
Nevertheless, even leaving aside the cost of the whole project, a short assessment of
Labour’s  proposals,  published  by  the  non-partisan  Institute  of  Fiscal  Studies,  was
somewhat sceptical about how much better-run the industries would be. In particular,
the  authors  of  the  study  noted  that  Labour  plans  to  pursue  extra  objectives  like
increasing the number of workers in rail and strengthening renewable energies while
“maintain[ing]  prices  at  or  below  current  levels  would  add  additional  layers  of
complexity to this challenge”.19
18 This issue of complexity is explored here by Nicholas Sowels, in a brief introduction to
complexity  theory  and  how  it  relates  to  public  services.  Put  at  its  most  simple,
complexity  theory  draws  on  developments  in  natural  sciences  which  go  beyond
Newtonian  physics  and  its  strong,  predictable  causalities  to  understand  how  the
various  elements  of  complex  systems  may  interact  in  variable  and  sometimes
unpredictable ways. Such analyses in natural sciences have been progressively applied
to social sciences over the last twenty years, and to public services too, especially as
NPM has led to far more complex system architectures compared to the bureaucratic
structures which dominated public (and private) organisations for much to the 20th
century. Almost by definition, recourse to complexity theory suggests that looking for
simple  solutions  or  policy  prescriptions  to  complex  issues  is  unlikely  to  work
particularly well.
19 From a public policy point of view, the notion of rising complexity also has its role to
play in the growing democratic deficits which have emerged in liberal democracies in
recent  decades,  and  which  are  one  of  the  contributory  causes  of  national  populist
reactions,  such  as  the  drive  to  Brexit  since  2016.  In  a  special  issue  of  The  Political
Quarterly on Rethinking Democracy (published in January 2019), leading British political
scientists  examine  the  flaws  of  the  British  political  and  economic  system  which
ultimately led to the Brexit vote,20 which in turn is perhaps leading to the greatest
constitutional  upheaval  Britain  has  known  since  the  Glorious  Revolution,  even
threatening the very existence of the Union. Thus, on the issue of accountability that
we are  examining here,  for  example,  Tony Wright  notes  that  even as  markets  had
“implanted themselves into the public realm”, leading to a “sense of control lost and
responsibility  dissolved”,  “in  many  respects  the  accountability  of  governments  has
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dramatically  increased  in  recent  times”.21 Yet  he  also  goes  on  to  note  that  “the
explosion  of  accountability  that  has  taken  place  has  not  been  accompanied  by  a
strengthened attachment to, or trust in, the institutions of democratic government”.
The  sheer  increased  complexity  of  public  policy  has  surely  a  role  to  play  in  this
paradoxical situation: after all, are we – even as informed readers – able to assess the
merits  of  extending  the  working  lives  of nuclear  power  plants,  say,  building  third
generation pressurised water reactors (as at Flamanville or Hinkley Point), or pulling
out of nuclear energy rapidly, given its low carbon emissions? And what of the people
we send to Parliament or the Assemblée Nationale to represent us? Indeed, for Wright, it
would help if politicians were more open about the limits of what they can do.
20 More  generally,  greater  complexity  surely  also  has  its  role  to  play  in  the  widely-
discussed gap that has emerged between internationally integrated “elites” and “left
behind” populations. In Vernon Bogdanor’s contribution on Rethinking Democracy,  he
states boldly that “[s]ince the 1980s, the British people have made great strides towards
citizenship in the economic sphere and in their relationship with public services”.22 He
attributes this to the extension of share ownership under Thatcher, and the long term
impact of John Major’s Citizen’s Charter, which he claims have improved standards and
rights of redress. Yet at the same time, citizens have been “expected to remain passive
in their political lives”, while the constitutional reforms of the Blair era led to sharing
power among the elite, but little transfer of power from the elites to the people. For
Bogdanor,  the  future  lies  especially  in  injecting  direct  democracy  into  the  British
political system, notably at local government level. For its part, Labour under Jeremy
Corbyn did indeed suggest greater citizen involvement in managing public services23.
21 While  such  institutional  and  constitutional  change  may  no  doubt  provide  some
solutions to aspects of Britain’s democratic deficit(s), it ignores the economic and social
trends brought on by neoliberalism and globalisation and the fundamental way it has
strengthened  capital  at  the  expense  of  labour.  Here,  Colin  Crouch’s  contribution,
building on his work on post-democracy, is more relevant. He too identifies the shift in
the “vital energy of the political system”, which no longer rests in the institutions of
liberal democracy, as it has “disappeared into small private circles of economic and
political  elites”.24 In  his  original  arguments  on  post-democracy,  he  argued  that
movements emerging from the population at large are therefore needed to give the
system a shock from time to time, raising new questions; and these could be feminism,
environmentalism and xenophobic nationalism. In the event, it has been the latter that
has triumphed in the UK (and in the US), as questions of migration, the “added frisson
of  occasional  acts  of  Islamic  terrorism”  and  “feeling  of  loss  of  national  control
facilitated by globalisation” have “apparently threatened national identities”.25
22 So much for some of the causes of Brexit.  What now of its consequences for public
services? Clémence Fourton here examines how constitutional change in the UK, and
especially devolution have affected public  services across the nations of  the United
Kingdom, and how such changes could well be amplified by Brexit. More specifically,
she points to the diverging welfare systems that now exist within the UK, as powers for
most welfare services have been devolved. She notes that EU membership, on the other
hand,  has acted to create an overall  legal  framework which nevertheless  ensures a
certain homogeneity on the basis of EU social and employment laws, as well as human
rights  legislation.  As  Britain  will  now  be  repatriating  all  EU  laws,  with  a  view  to
changing them, Brexit may well lead to further divergence in welfare systems within
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the UK. Tensions may also arise between England and the other nations of the Union
should  EU  social  funds  and  agricultural  subsidies  not  be  replaced  by  domestic
programmes. Finally, the Conservatives have specifically weakened their commitments
to ensuring that labour rights will remain the same after Brexit, and will most likely
undermine protective legislation in line with their penchant for deregulation.
23 As for the Brexiteers-national populists’ record in government so far, it has been a very
mixed bag indeed. At the time of writing (late summer 2020), the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, seems to be having a good Covid-19 crisis, and has generally
been applauded for providing massive and rapid financial support to households and
businesses.  Otherwise,  the Johnson government is  not  deemed to have handled the
Covid-19 crisis especially well so far, with policies often seeming to be inconsistent and
involving U-turns. The “A” levels fiasco too suggests considerable incompetence by the
government,  while  its  sacking  of  the  senior  civil  servant  at  the  Department  of
Education reveals  an unwillingness to take responsibility for its  actions on the one
hand, and provides further evidence of the apparent upheaval which Downing Street is
planning for the civil service on the other hand. More generally, according to Martin
Wolf (chief economics commentator of The Financial Times), Johnson’s team, as populists
elsewhere,  pursues politics  more as  a  matter  of  performance than as  a  question of
government, for which they care little.26 Quite how the Conservatives under Johnson
will act to improve public services, especially in the light of Brexit and as Covid-19 rolls
on, remains to be seen, and whether they succeed may well be doubted.
24 It is of course impossible to know what the lasting impact of the “coronacrisis” will be
on  our  societies  and  public  services,  in  the  UK and  worldwide.  For  all  the  talk  of
emerging from Covid-19 with a different set of political, social and economic priorities
–  say  to  fight  global  warming,  defend  biodiversity,  combat  plastic  pollution  and
perhaps reduce inequalities in recognition of the importance of “front line” workers –
there will most likely be an overwhelming attempt to get back to business as usual: just
as  there  was  after  the  financial  crisis  and  Great  Recession  in  2007-2009.  Yet  the
immediate  impact  of  the  crisis  has  been  to  see  governments  intervene  absolutely
massively  to  support  households  and  businesses  –  for  the  time being.  The
macroeconomic  policy  environment  has  changed  significantly  in  many  ways,  as
interest rates are likely to remain low for the foreseeable future, giving governments
much  more  leeway  to  maintain  active  policies.  The  current  health  situation  also
reminds us that States are what we turn to in times of crises, and that accountability is
not  the  priority  when  institutions  need  to  be  urgently  adapted  to  fast-changing
circumstances: indeed, accountability seems to be an after-thought, rather than built in
to structures and processes in the first  place.  Yet,  as this issue indicates,  there are
always further ways of institutionalising accountability. The longer the Covid-19 crisis
goes on, the greater the challenges to public policies and services will be and more will
likely be demanded of government. Enhancing accountability will surely be one vital
component to ensuring that greater State action remains compatible with the largely-
open and pluralistic societies of today’s liberal democracies.
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